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This paper focuses on the economic issues arising from
two uses of genomics: 1) the development of gene ther-
apy; 2) and use of pharmacogenetics to identify a pa-
tient’s genotype before treatment to exclude those who
will not benefit or who may be harmed. We conclude
that private-sector investment aimed at developing gene
therapy for monogenic diseases is likely to be socially
suboptimal. Short-term administration regimens yielding
long-term therapeutic benefits are likely to meet payer re-
sistance to large “one-off” costs because of budget con-
straints or, in competitive systems, concerns that the sav-
ings would accrue to future insurers or would attract
high-cost patients. For some monogenic diseases, patient
 
numbers may be too small to support commercial de-
velopment without changes to orphan drug legislation
or payer willingness to accept higher cost-effectiveness
thresholds. In the case of pharmacogenetics, we conclude
that it can often be socially optimal to test before treat-
ment, particularly if the proportion of nonresponders is
high, if there is a potential for serious adverse reactions,
or if the test is inexpensive. Genetic testing that frag-
ments the patient population could reduce incentives for
R&D unless prices are adjusted to reflect the higher ex-
pected benefits of targeted treatment per patient. Even in
situations where prices are adjusted, patient populations
may be too small to make commercial development via-
ble. This problem with small numbers is analogous to
that associated with gene therapy for monogenic diseases
and may require similar remedies if society values devel-
oping treatments for these diseases.
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Introduction
 
Genomics offers great promise for providing new
and more effective therapies and diagnostic tests
for patients. Many new medicines will arise from
the use of pharmacogenomics in conventional drug
discovery as knowledge of the human genome in-
creases understanding of disease. This paper fo-
cuses on the economic issues arising from two rel-
atively novel uses of genomics:
1. the development of gene therapy, where the
aim is to insert genes that will produce or regu-
late the expression of proteins that are related
to the patient’s disease. This approach is most
immediately relevant to monogenic diseases,
many of which are currently incurable. The
hope is that gene therapy will provide long-
term therapeutic benefits;
2. the use of pharmacogenetics to identify a pa-
tient’s genotype before treatment, to identify
those who will not benefit or who may be
harmed. Here genomics is used to identify genetic
traits that may lead either to nonresponse or to
adverse reactions to specific medicines for any in-
dication, including the great majority of diseases
that are polygenic but in which genetic makeup
can affect response to specific treatments.
We examine whether existing reimbursement
and regulatory regimes will encourage the socially
optimal development of these two uses of genom-
ics and suggest possible policy changes. The high
costs and uncertainties associated with gene ther-
apy and its very novel modes of action, small pa-
tient numbers, and long-lived therapeutic effects
may lead to suboptimal levels of commercial re-
search. In the case of pharmacogenetics, testing
could be socially beneficial but nevertheless reduce
innovative firm’s incentives to develop new drugs.
This is in part due to the low numbers of patients
treated—because drugs would be targeted at a
subset of the patient population—and to the costs
of testing. This may be offset by reduced R&D
costs per drug developed or by unit price increases
that reflect the greater specificity of use and conse-
quent greater expected health gain per patient
treated.
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Formal Statement of the Problem
 
Assume that a new therapy (g) is considered cost-
effective by payers for their patients relative to an
existing treatment (0) if
(1)
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
 
 respectively, the prices of the gene therapy
and existing treatment;
 

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g,0
d
 
 
 

 
 change in other direct treatment costs;
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g,0
I
 
 
 

 
 change in indirect costs;
 

 
E
 
g,0
 
 
 

 
 change in quality-adjusted life years
(QALYs) or other outcome measures; and
k
 
p
 
 
 

 
 threshold cost per QALY at which an inter-
vention is considered cost-effective for the treat-
ment of patient group p.
We assume 
 

 
C
 
g,0
 
 and 
 

 
E
 
g,0
 
 are discounted at a
socially optimal rate. If k
 
p
 
 is optimally chosen (i.e.,
reflects the willingness to pay for additional in-
vestment in treatment of patient group p), then
equation 1 defines the condition for socially opti-
mal reimbursement. We can use it to define the
maximum price (P
 
g
max
 
) at which the new therapy is
cost effective:
(2)
or (2)
 

 
where  and represents
the social benefits (positive or negative) from treatment
g compared with treatment 0.
Assume that payers typically set the actual price
at some fraction 
 

 
 of the maximum price, where 
 

 
reflects the share of the social gain that accrues to
the innovator firm and (1 
 

 
 
 

 
) is the share captured
by the payer, so that
(3)
Consider now the perspective of the firm plan-
ning to invest in developing a new therapy (g). We
abstract from the fact that in practice 
 

 
 and P
 
g
max
 
may not be known with certainty because of a lack
of transparency in the price-setting process. Ignor-
ing this uncertainty and using a net present value in-
vestment-valuation approach, the producer’s break-
even profit constraint can be written:
(4)
where
(
 
Π
 
) 
 

 
 discounted present value of net revenue over
the T years of the product’s market life (“profit”);
ΔCg,0 ΔEg,0 kp<⁄
ΔCg,o Pg P0 ΔCg,0
d ΔCg,0
I
+ +–=
Pg
max kpΔEg,0 P0 ΔCg,0
d ΔCg,0
I
+ +( )+=
Pg
max b=
b kpΔEg,0 P0 ΔCg,0
d ΔCg,0
I
+ +( )+=
Pg α b α Pg
max
.= =
ΠT ΣT Pg M–( )QtNt l r+( ) t–[ ] F r, L, p( )–=
 
M 
 

 
 variable cost per treatment to the producer,
assumed to be invariant over time;
N 
 

 
 number of patients treated per year;
Q 
 

 
 number of treatments per patient per year,
such that NQ is the number of treatments sold per
year;
F 
 

 
 discounted present value of the firm’s R&D
cost, with 
 
F
 
r
 
, 
 
F
 
L
 
 
 

 
 0, 
 
F
 
p
 
 
 

 
 0;
r 
 

 
 cost of capital;
L 
 

 
 expected years from discovery to launch;
p 
 

 
 probability of success in showing safety and
efficacy in clinical trials;
other fixed costs are zero.
To assess the implications of the payer’s cost-
effectiveness requirement on the producer’s break-
even constraint, we substitute the price from equa-
tion 3 into the firm’s break-even constraint in
equation 4. Therefore,
(4)
 

 
Equation 4
 

 
 provides a framework in which to
consider how the characteristics of gene therapy
and pharmacogenetics may affect their commer-
cial viability compared with other pharmaceutical
R&D.
 
Gene Therapy
 
Let us consider effects on revenue and R&D costs.
The total operating net revenue depends on:
1. the social value of treatment b (the cost savings
and gain in quality of life) and the producer’s
share, 
 

 
;
2. the number of patients treated per year N,
which may be low because most monogenic
diseases (i.e., those involving only a single gene)
affect a relatively small number of patients;
3. Q, which may be small because of the long-
term benefits of gene therapies, implying that
each patient may require treatment to be ad-
ministered only once or twice a year rather
than once or twice a day, the standard regimen
for many pharmacotherapeutic agents adminis-
tered to chronically ill patients; and
4. the variable cost of producing and delivering
the treatment, M, which is likely to be signifi-
cantly higher for gene therapies than for other
drugs owing to both the novel delivery systems
required and the small patient base over which
to realize scale economies.
The extended duration of benefits and conse-
quent reduction in frequency of administration
ΠT ΣT α b M–( )QtNt l r+( ) t–[ ] F r, L, p( ).–=
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(low Q per patient for long-lasting therapies)
would be irrelevant if payers were willing to as-
sume that the cost of new therapies would be fixed
relative to the full social benefits: P 
 

 
 
 

 
 P
 
max
 
. In
this case, the price for gene therapy treatment
would increase proportionately with the duration
of its effects. A low Q would be associated with a
relatively high benefit, b, per administered treat-
ment compared with a once-a-day alternative ther-
apy, thus preserving neutral incentives for efficient
investment in R&D with respect to duration of
benefits. This ideal may, however, be undermined
in practice for several reasons.
First, payers tend to scrutinize and bargain ag-
gressively over products that are priced relatively
high per dose or per patient treated. If so, the pro-
ducer’s share is a decreasing proportion of the
maximum price: d
 

 
/dP
 
max
 
 
 

 
 0. Second, turnover
of patient populations could make competing
health insurers reluctant to pay for long-lasting
therapies because the insurer that pays for the ini-
tial treatment does not capture the full savings in
future treatment costs if patients subsequently
switch to other insurers. Thus the risk of adverse
selection could reinforce the incentive of insurers
to avoid offering long-lived therapies that target
high-cost patients, such as gene therapy. This
should be less of a problem in countries where pa-
tients have a limited choice of health plans, such
as Canada and the United Kingdom. However, in
these systems managers and doctors face annual
budget constraints that limit their ability to invest
in treatments that have higher immediate costs but
longer-term benefits.
The private cost of R&D, F(r, L, p), may be
atypically high for gene therapy compared with
conventional therapy despite the relatively smaller
requirements in terms of trial sizes. The extremely
novel mode of action means that the probability
of success, p, is very low and the expected dura-
tion of the R&D process, L, is relatively long. Sev-
eral hundred clinical trials of gene therapy have
been initiated but none has been successfully com-
pleted so far. The deaths in 1999 of two trial par-
ticipants [1] have made expectations even more
pessimistic.
Thus, values for each element of the expression
for 
 
Π
 
T
 
 are likely to be lower in the case of gene
therapies for monogenic diseases than correspond-
ing values for conventional therapies for major
diseases. The high risk and costs of R&D to com-
panies are a reflection of real social costs arising
from basic research into new technologies, the
benefits of which cannot be fully expropriated by
the company. If reimbursement systems are biased
against therapies providing long-term benefits, un-
der-investment compared to the social optimum
may result.
An examination of clinical trials in gene ther-
apy tends to support our concerns that low patient
numbers and investor perception of payer resis-
tance to long-lived therapies may be influencing
the allocation of R&D efforts. The majority of
gene therapy trials are in cancer indications (on-
cology), followed closely by trials directed at cures
for AIDS and HIV infection [2]. Many trials are
focused on variants of treatment that would re-
quire repeat administration rather than providing
a one-off cure. Only one monogenic disorder, cys-
tic fibrosis, is the subject of significant clinical de-
velopment, due in part to the early discovery of
the gene for this disease. Unlike all other areas of
drug development, most clinical trials in gene ther-
apy are undertaken with at least partial public
funding [3]. This suggests that the initial promise
of gene therapy—that of delivering cures for mo-
nogenic diseases—is unlikely to be realized without
changes in incentives or significant public invest-
ment.
The problem of insufficient commercial incen-
tives for investment in drugs for small populations
is not unique to gene therapy. Orphan drug legis-
lation enacted in the United States in 1983 pro-
vides special incentives, including 5-year market
exclusivity for the orphan indication and special
tax credits, for drugs to treat diseases that affect
fewer than 200,000 US patients. The European
Union has now established an orphan drug re-
gime. However, long-lived gene therapies are dis-
advantaged relative to conventional therapies by
the current legislation if payers resist price in-
creases in proportion to the duration of the ef-
fects. If the 200,000 patient threshold is the num-
ber of patients expected to use an orphan drug per
day per year, then, arguably, this number should
be adjusted for long-lasting gene therapies. For ex-
ample, if the gene therapy lasts 5 years, then in
steady state only one-fifth of the population with
the disease would be treated per year. Thus, to
provide neutral incentives the orphan drug thresh-
old for long-lasting therapies should be 
 
n
 
 
 
	
 
200,000, where 
 
n is the average duration of bene-
fits for one treatment with gene therapy relative to
that of conventional therapies. This will increase
the likelihood that a gene therapy receives orphan
status and the associated benefit of market exclu-
sivity, which should increase the price the com-
pany receives for the gene therapy, thereby in-
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creasing , the share of the social benefit that the
company obtains.
Thus, the characteristics of gene therapy—long
and uncertain R&D, a small patient base, and in-
frequent treatment—may lead to suboptimal com-
mercial investment in these therapies. Reimburse-
ment systems introduce a bias against gene therapy
if payers respond to budgetary or commercial pres-
sures by focusing on short-term drug-budget costs
without due weight to long-term health benefits
and societal savings. Although society has signaled
a willingness to pay additional subsidies to en-
courage treatments for orphan diseases, current
legislation is not neutral between treatments ad-
ministered on a daily basis and those administered
sporadically or once or twice in a lifetime. We
consider the public policy implications in the final
section of the paper.
Pharmacogenetics
Pharmacogenetic testing is designed to identify pa-
tients’ genotypes so that drugs can be targeted to
the subgroup whose genetic makeup makes them
most likely to benefit. This raises the expected ef-
fectiveness per patient treated and hence the cost-
effectiveness of the drug by eliminating the cost of
treating patients whose genetic makeup makes
them unlikely to benefit (nonresponders) or likely
to suffer harm (adverse responders). For example:
1. New tests based on the ApoE gene may identify
patients who are more likely to benefit from
drugs designed to slow the symptomatic degen-
eration associated with Alzheimer’s disease [4].
2. Testing for the human CysLT1 receptor for cys-
teinyl leukotrienes may predict the effective-
ness in individual patients of the three new cys-
teinyl leukotriene antagonists for asthma [5].
3. The presence of the B1 variant of the CETP
gene appears to predict the response of patients
with coronary atherosclerosis to statin treat-
ment. In a clinical trial statins slowed disease
progression in B1B1 carriers but not in B2B2 car-
riers [6].
Payers would rationally adopt pharmacogenetic
testing before treatment if the savings from treat-
ing fewer patients and avoiding complications ex-
ceeded the costs of testing. For drug companies
pharmacogenetic testing means lower patient vol-
ume and hence lower revenues per drug, other
things being equal. This reduction in gross sales
may be exacerbated if payers subtract the costs of
the genetic screening from the price that they are
willing to pay or reimburse for the drug. A key is-
sue, therefore, is the extent to which we might ex-
pect drug prices to increase as a consequence of
testing, as might be the case if the innovator were
able to get a share of any increased societal benefit
arising from testing.
To examine the potential impact of testing from
societal, payer, and company perspectives we
adapt the formal model set out earlier to introduce
responders and nonresponders, adverse reactions,
and testing costs.
Let N1 be the number of patients who benefit
from the drug. N2 is the number who do not bene-
fit but who cannot be identified without testing, so
Let b1  kp E1g,0 
 (P0 
 C1g,0d 
 C1g,0I) i.e.,
the health gain plus cost savings per patient rela-
tive to current treatment. Only the responders, N1,
obtain these benefits.
Let a2  kp E2g,0 
 (P0 
 C2g,0d 
 C2g,0I) de-
note the adverse health effect (E2  0) plus the
consequential costs of the adverse reaction for
each patient in group N2.
We let Pg1max be the maximum price of the drug
without testing, Pg2max be the maximum price of
the drug with testing, and Pt be the price of the
test. Thus, adapting equation 2, the maximum
price of the drug without testing is
(5)
With testing, the payer’s maximum price for a
drug targeted solely at the responders is
(6)
The change in the maximum price, which is the
social value of testing, is therefore
(7)
This social value of testing reflects three factors:
1. the expected health benefit per patient treated,
which is equal to b1 (the benefit per responder)
times the proportion of nonresponders N2/N;
2. the averted costs of treating the adverse effects
of the drug on nonresponders, a2, times the
proportion of nonresponders N2/N;
3. a cost of testing the whole patient population,
Pt N, amortized over the N1 responders.
The first two components will be non-negative
and testing will be beneficial if these effects exceed
N N1 N2+( )=
Pg1
max b1 N1 a2 N2–( ) N.⁄=
Pg2
max b1 PtN N1.⁄–=
ΔPg2
max Pg2
max Pg1
max
–
b1 1 N1 N⁄–( ) Pt N N1⁄ a2 N2 N⁄+–
b1 a2+( ) N2 N⁄( ) Pt N N1.⁄–
=
=
=
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the third element, the cost of testing. Formally,
testing offers benefit to society if Pgmax  0, or
(8)
Thus testing is of benefit if the savings from
avoiding treatment and side effects for the N2 non-
responders exceeds the cost of testing all patients.
In the simplest case, if a2 is zero (no side effects)
and we substitute for Pg1max from equation 5 this
can be rewritten:
(9)
Testing is worthwhile from a societal perspective
if the ratio of nonresponders to the total population
exceeds the ratio of the cost of the test to the social
value of the drug in the absence of testing.
Returning to the general case where there may
be adverse events (a2  0), and assuming that the
price obtained by the company reflects the same
share  of the social benefit of the drug with and
without testing, then equation 7 shows that test-
ing increases the price of the drug obtained by the
company:
(10)
The company gets a share  of the social gain
of avoiding the drug costs and adverse events as-
sociated with treating nonresponders but also
bears the share of  of the costs of testing. It is re-
warded and motivated to produce more specific
drugs. In this case only the share  of the cost of
the test Pt is borne by the company, with the payer
accepting to pay the remainder (1  ). This fol-
lows from the assumption that the cost of the test
is deducted to arrive at social benefit before it is
divided between the producer and the payer. Note
that in the simplest case of zero adverse reactions
and test costs (i.e., if a2  0, Pt  0) the price
would rise in proportion to the increase in propor-
tion of patients expected to benefit:
In practice, payers may be unlikely to permit
the price of the drug, adjusted for the cost of test-
ing and of side effects averted, to increase in pro-
portion to its expected benefit per patient. We
suggested above that payers scrutinize most strin-
gently those products that are priced relatively
high; actual price is then a decreasing proportion
of the maximum price: d/dPmax  0, in which
case Pg would be lower than that suggested by
equation 10. The cost of the test, Pt, the ratio of
nonresponders to responders, N2/N1, the severity
of the adverse reactions, and the value of  are all
b1 a2+( ) N2 N⁄( ) Pt N N1.⁄>
N2 N1 N2+( )⁄ Pt Pg1max.⁄>
αΔPg
max
α b a+( ) N2 N⁄( ) αPt N N1⁄–= .
αΔPg
max
αb1 N2 N⁄( ) or Pg2 Pg1⁄ N N1⁄= = .
crucial to the ability of a company to obtain a
price premium for a more targeted product and to
face, ex ante, neutral incentives for developing tar-
geted products versus more indiscriminate prod-
ucts with lower expected benefits per patient
treated. We consider in turn the payer and com-
pany perspectives.
The Payer Perspective
We can note the general conditions in which test-
ing is of benefit to the payer. Let B1 denote the po-
tential payer benefit per period with no test, B2 de-
note the potential payer benefit with testing, Pg1 be
the price the payer is paying for the drug in the ab-
sence of a test, and Pg1 
 P be the price with a
test. Note that we assume that payers focus on
health effects and all costs. Adapting equations 5
and 6 above yields
(11)
(12)
In assessing the cost-effectiveness of testing to
the payer, potential savings from avoiding adverse
events and not paying for drugs to treat nonre-
sponders have to be offset by the costs of testing
and any higher price that is charged by the inno-
vator. The protocol with testing offers greater
benefit to the payer than does indiscriminate treat-
ment of all patients if
(13)
If there are no adverse effects, i.e., a2  0, and if
the payer does not give the company a price in-
crease following the introduction of testing, so
that Pg  0, then equation 13 reduces to
(14)
Testing is worthwhile for the payer if the ratio
of nonresponders to the total population exceeds
the ratio of the price of the test to the price of the
drug. More generally, the extent to which payers
are prepared to award higher prices, i.e., Pg  0
is crucial to creating consistent incentives for com-
panies to develop new products using pharmaco-
genetics given society’s cost-effectiveness thresh-
old kp. Of course if companies are able to develop
other products that treat nonresponders at prices
that result in a positive incremental cost-effective-
ness below the cost-effectiveness threshold kp,
overall payer expenditures will rise. This may give
rise to rationing issues if payer budgets are con-
strained (so kp will rise) or to more aggressive bar-
B1 N1b1 N2a2– N Pg1–=
B2 N1b1 N1 Pg1 ΔP+( )– N Pt.–=
B2 B1– 0, or>
N2 a2 Pg1+( ) N1ΔPg NPt.+>
N2 N⁄ Pt Pg⁄> .
10 Danzon and Towse
gaining by payers seeking to reduce . We do not
consider this issue further. We now consider the
impact on the company.
The Company Perspective
Assume that the innovative firm faces two choices.
It could ignore the possibility of pharmacogenetic
testing and develop a traditional drug. This drug
would be targeted indiscriminately to all patients
with the disease in question, of which a propor-
tion receives no benefit and may be harmed. The
innovative firm’s alternative choice is to develop
and sell a genetic test that would identify the N1
patients who will benefit and produce a drug tar-
geted to them. Assume that the test can be sold at
a price Pt and produced at constant marginal cost
Ct. Adapting equation 4, assuming that Q  1 for
simplicity, let 1, Pg be the producer’s profit and
price, respectively, with no testing, and 2, Pg 

Pg, the profit and price with testing, and F2, the
R&D cost with testing. Therefore,
(15)
(16)
The producer’s profit is greater with the test than
without only if Π2T  Π1T  0, or 
(17)
Equation 17 shows that if the final drug price is
unchanged, i.e., Pg  0, the innovative firm has
no incentive to invest in pharmacogenetic testing
in development that will result in a narrower indi-
cation unless there are savings in R&D costs (F1 
F2) or profits to be made on the provision of the
tests. Savings in R&D costs may be possible if, for
example, genetic testing permits phase III trials to
be targeted to fewer patients who are more likely
to benefit. Thus, efficacy may be demonstrated
with much smaller trials. However, there may be
additional costs if either the link between the gene
and the response or the reliability of the test has to
be validated. It is also possible that with genetic
testing the drug could be designed such that it is
effective for a larger fraction of the patient popu-
lation. In that case, the tendency for pharmacoge-
netics to reduce the average size of the target pop-
ulation per drug would be mitigated. Moreover, if
the proportion of patients N2/N who fail to bene-
fit is expected to be relatively large, an untargeted
Π1
T ΣT Pg1 M–( )Nt 1 r+( ) t–[ ] F1–=
Π2
T ΣT Pg1 ΔP M–+( )N1t 1 r+( ) t–[ ]
F2 N
t Pt Ct–( ) 1 r+( ) t–+ .
–=
ΣT Pg1 ΔPg M–+( )N1t 1 r+( ) t–
F1 F2–( ) Nt Pt Ct–( ) 1 r+( ) t–
ΣT Pg1 M–( )Nt[ ] 1 r+( ) t– .
>
+
+
drug might fail to qualify for reimbursement be-
cause of poor cost-effectiveness.
More realistically, with free entry to the busi-
ness of developing genetic tests, pretreatment tests
are likely to be developed irrespective of the ac-
tions of the innovator when they can yield a net
saving to the payer. This occurs when the cost of
testing the entire patient population N Pt is less
than the savings from avoiding treatment of non-
responders Pg N2 plus any savings from averting
harm, a2 N2. It is likely, therefore, that drug pro-
ducers will have incentives to do this testing them-
selves as part of drug development rather than
wait for others to do it after drugs reach the mar-
ket. In the latter case, the producer suffers the loss
of sales but gets none of the potential benefits of
smaller trials or an improved drug design. Never-
theless, to the extent that pharmacogenetic testing
tends to reduce the patient population per drug,
some drugs may not be worth developing once
testing becomes an option if the reduction in ex-
pected revenues due to population fragmentation
exceeds the reduction in R&D costs.
The key issue, then, is what happens to drug
prices. If pre- and post-testing prices reflect ex-
pected social benefits, the price of the drug will in-
crease in proportion to the expected benefits (net
of testing costs) as specificity increases and the risk
of zero benefit or positive harm declines as a con-
sequence of genetic testing.
The willingness of payers to award higher
prices for targeted benefits (i.e., maintaining a
constant value of ) will be essential to retaining
neutrality in investment incentives.
Examples
Two drug launches illustrate the potential impact of
testing on manufacturers and payers. In one case, ne-
bacumab (Centoxin™, Centocor, Malvern, PA) no
test was available, whereas in the case of trastu-
zumab (Herceptin, Genentech, San Francisco, CA),
tests are available.
Nebacumab. Nebacumab was launched in 1991
in most European countries [7] as a treatment for
sepsis. However, it only worked in those cases where
the sepsis was due to Gram-negative bacteremia,
or approximately one-third of all sepsis cases. With
a cost of $4000 per patient, doctors found them-
selves under pressure to use the drug on all cases
of sepsis, despite knowing that for every 1000 pa-
tients treated, $2.67 million was being spent on
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drugs for patients who could not benefit. It even-
tually became clear that nebacumab was harmful
to patients without Gram-negative bacteremia. A
trial in which nebacumab was given to 538 sepsis
patients showed that, although the 28-day mortal-
ity of the 200 patients with Gram-negative bacter-
emia was reduced to 30%, overall mortality was
not significantly different from the 49% mortality
in the placebo group. This implies that mortality
in the other 338 patients was 60%, an increase of
11%. Centocor withdrew the product from the
European market and withdrew its FDA applica-
tion. In the absence of a bedside diagnostic test to
promptly identify patients with Gram-negative
bacteremia, the product was of no value to sepsis
patients as a group and of no value to payers.
Recall that the necessary condition for testing
to be beneficial for the payer as compared with
not testing is B2  B1  0. Taking equation 13 and
letting Pg  0, then
(18)
In these circumstances testing is worthwhile
from a payer perspective if the ratio of nonre-
sponders to the total population exceeds the ratio
of the price of the test to the price of the drug plus
the cost of the adverse reactions experienced by
the nonresponders. The maximum price at which
a test is worthwhile to a payer is therefore
(19)
In the nebacumab case, using the data above we
obtain the following rough values: N2/N  0.67,
a2  [0.11 (20 	 $10,000)]  $22,000 if we as-
sume that each death costs 20 QALYs, E  20,
and kp is $10,000. We ignore extra treatment
costs, and Pgl  $4000. Thus the maximum value
of a test is Pt  0.67 	 $26,000, or Pt  $17,420.
However, this assumes that at a drug price of
$4000, nebacumab was cost-effective and that the
benefit to the payer, B2, as set out in equation 12,
was positive. If we assume that the health gains
per patient and the marginal cost per QALY
threshold are as in the case of the adverse reac-
tions, then b1  [0.19 (20 	 $10,000)] 
$38,000.
From equation 11, the payer benefit per patient
treated with no testing is
Thus, at the price of $4000, the drug is not cost-
effective without testing. For the drug to be cost-
effective with testing and with treatment confined
N2 N⁄ Pt a2 Pg1+( )⁄> .
Pt N2 N⁄[ ] a2 Pg1+( ).<
B1 0.33 $38,000 0.67 $22,000 $4000–×–×
$12,540 $14,740 $4000 $6200–=––
=
=
to patients with Gram-negative bacteremia, from
equation 12,
Thus, using these assumptions, with a bedside
diagnostic test costing up to $11,333 per test, ne-
bacumab would have been cost-effective to payers
at a price of $4000. Without the test the product
was not cost-effective at any price.
Trastuzumab. Trastuzumab is a new product for
the treatment of breast cancer. It benefits only
those patients with lesions that express increased
quantities of the HER-2 protein, or approximately
25% of patients [8]. Three diagnostic tests have
been approved by the FDA [9]. Each costs less than
$100 per test. There are no adverse reactions in
the patient group that does not respond. Thus, equa-
tion 14 shows that, conditional on the decision to
use the product, using the test is of benefit to pay-
ers if Pg  Pt/[N2/N]. This means that Pg  100/0.75,
Pg  $133.
The price of trastuzumab in the United States is
$1382 for a 440-mg injection, and patients need
to take therapy throughout the period in which
the disease is being treated. Thus, testing clearly
makes economic sense compared to not testing.
However, this analysis does not consider whether
there is an overall payer benefit from using the
product with testing, i.e., if B2  0. We do not
have the information on which to make that as-
sessment, nor do we know if the product will pro-
vide positive returns to the company.
We can also use equation 14 to ask what pro-
portion of nonresponders would represent breakeven
for the payer. If we assume that the total treat-
ment cost per patient is $7000 (five sets of treat-
ment) then Pt/Pg1  0.015; i.e., it is worthwhile
from the payer’s perspective to test if more than
1.5% of patients are nonresponders. Thus testing
is highly worthwhile because the test is very inex-
pensive relative to the price of the drug.
The nebacumab example clearly illustrates the
potential gains to payers and manufacturers af-
forded by diagnostic tests that can distinguish po-
tential responders from nonresponders so that treat-
ment is targeted solely to the responders. In this
case, an appropriate test was not available and the
product had to be abandoned, at least for the pur-
pose for which it was originally developed. If a
B2 0>
$38,000 $4000 N N⁄ 1 Pt–– 0>
Pt 0.33 $34,000×<
Pt $11,333<
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test had been available to distinguish patients who
would benefit from those who would be harmed,
the price of the drug could have been higher, de-
pending on the cost of the test, and would still
have been cost-effective for payers. Of course we
do not know if nebacumab would have earned a
commercial return for its developers even in these
circumstances. The trastuzumab example again in-
dicates the value of a test to payers. It shows that
with a low test cost, testing makes sense even
when nonresponders are a small fraction of poten-
tial patients, suggesting that manufacturers could
benefit from having such tests at the time of drug
development. Such knowledge can be used either
to design the drug to fit a broader spectrum of pa-
tients or to abandon products early if they can
only benefit a small fraction of patients and hence
will never cover their development costs. Of course
the implication is that with testing becoming feasi-
ble and, in all probability, supplied competitively
by third parties, drug producers will face smaller
target populations. In some cases the resulting tar-
get population may be too small for the drug to be
commercially viable unless payers increase prices
to reflect the increase in expected benefits per pa-
tient treated. In the absence of such price adjust-
ments, patients who would have benefited may
forgo treatment unless R&D costs for targeted drugs
can be significantly reduced. Even with such ad-
justments, the patient population may be too small
to enable R&D costs to be recovered.
Implications for Public Policy
In the case of gene therapy, we concluded that pri-
vate sector investment in developing cures for mo-
nogenic diseases is likely to be socially suboptimal
for several reasons:
1. Long-lived therapies were likely to meet payer
resistance to large one-off costs because of
budget constraints or, in competitive systems,
concerns that the savings would accrue to
other insurers or that such therapies would at-
tract high-cost patients.
2. Current orphan drug legislation to encourage
development of treatments for diseases with
low patient numbers is therefore not neutral as
between once-a-day and long-lived therapies.
3. The novel nature of the treatment implies an
atypically high risk of failure and a long delay
to success, making these therapies unattractive
to private investors.
Evidence on trial activity appears to confirm our
assessment. Public investment is already playing a
major role in the development of gene therapies for
monogenic diseases, and this may be the best policy
to address the development risk. However, adjust-
ing reimbursement norms and orphan drug laws so
that they are neutral between long-lived and once-
a-day therapies might be a better way of achieving
the appropriate mix of private and public funds
once public funding has established proof of con-
cept. In addition to the benefits offered by orphan
drug status and public funding of trials to establish
proof of concept, one must also consider the issue
of whether payer cost-effectiveness thresholds for
monogenic diseases should be higher than for other
diseases. It is therefore important that the full social
benefit of such an adjustment is obtained by signal-
ing to companies that this is the case.
In the case of pharmacogenetics, testing will often
be socially optimal, particularly if the proportion of
nonresponders is high, if serious adverse reactions
can arise, or if the test is inexpensive. The problem
of patient fragmentation that results from genetic
testing is most appropriately addressed by adjusting
prices to reflect higher benefits of targeted treat-
ment. However, two potential problems remain:
1. Payers may be reluctant to adjust prices up-
ward for targeted treatments to reflect the in-
crease in expected benefits per patient treated
that results from treating only those patients
who are genetically appropriate candidates.
Doing so requires companies and payers to use
economic evaluation to identify the higher
value associated with such targeting.
2. If genetic testing reduces populations eligible
for treatment but does not significantly reduce
the costs of R&D through smaller trials re-
quired to show efficacy, and if prices are not
adjusted, then an increasing number of poten-
tial treatments may be shelved for lack of com-
mercial viability at normal payer thresholds.
Even where prices are adjusted, patient popula-
tions may be too small to make commercial develop-
ment viable. The problem with small numbers is
analogous to that associated with gene therapy for
monogenic diseases and may require similar solu-
tions if society wishes to find cures for these diseases.
References
1 Langreth R. Gene therapy is dealt a set back by the
FDA. Wall Street Journal. October 11, 1999.
2 Lehman Brothers. Gene Therapy: the Ultimate Ap-
Gene Therapy and Pharmacogenetics 13
plication of Genomics. New York: Lehman Broth-
ers Inc., 1997.
3 Martin PA, Thomas SM. The commercial develop-
ment of gene therapy in Europe and the USA.
Hum Gene Ther 1998;9:87–114.
4 Bell J. The human genome. In: Marinker M, Peck-
ham M. eds. Clinical Futures. London: BMJ Books,
1998.
5 Lynch KRO, Neill GP, Liu Q, et al. Characterisa-
tion of the human cysteinyl leukotriene Cys LT1
receptor. Nature 1999;399:789–93.
6 Kuivenhoven JA, Jukema JW, Zwinderman AH,
et al. The role of a common variant of the choles-
teryl ester transfer protein gene in the progression
of coronary atherosclerosis. N Eng J Med 1998;
338:86–93.
7 Centoxin: a lesson on patient selection? Pharm
Pricing Rev 1999;4:34.
8 Wisecarver JL. HER-2/neu Testing Comes of Age.
Am J Clin Path 1999;111:229–301.
9 McNeil C. How should HER-2 status be deter-
mined? J Nat Cancer Inst 1999;91:10.
